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U.S. GOVERNMENT RAISES THE BAR ON '"DEEMED 
EXPORTS" AND CONTINUES OTHER TRADE RESTRICTIONS 
Conan P Gral/1es* and Ten)' L. FlIlld** 
Recently, the U.S. Government has taken a number of steps to tighten its 
regulations on so-called deemed exports, a pitt~t11 for companies who may not 
even be in the exp0l1 business. A company can be engaged in a deemed export if 
it allows certain foreign employees, who work in the U.S., to have access to 
restricted technologies such as micro-processors and high-tech computers. 
Many eompal1les arc not aware that the U.S. Commerce Department 
regulates the export of certain types of mIcro-processors, computers and 
computer software. The restrictions on such exports arc higher for some countries 
than others. In addition, a U.S. company may have no exports at all, but if it 
allows employees from eOllntries slIeh as China, Iran and India to have access to 
restricted technology, the company is deemed to have exported that technology 
to the employee's country unless the employees are U.S. citizens or permanent 
residents (green card holders). 
The Department of Commerce's Office of the Inspector General issued a 
report last year in which it suggested additional changes to increase national 
security, and the Bureau of Industry and Security is currently reviewing and 
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taking comments on this report.' The repOli suggested, among other things, that 
an individual's birth citi::ellship be considered for "dccmed export" purposes.2 
CUtTent standards require an employer to verify the current citizenship or 
permanent residency of an employee before granting access to restricted 
technology. 
If the suggested changes are implemented, an employer could be 
"exporting" restricted technology if it allowed an Iranian-born Canadian national 
employee to have access to that restricted technology. However, this restriction 
would likely not apply when the foreign born national has been granted U.S. 
citizenship or permanent residency) A much-heightened level of scrutiny will be 
required of employers, using or producing restricted technology, if the regula-
tions are passed. 
For example, paJiicipants 111 the developing commercial spaceflight 
industry arc facing significant challenges from such regulations since mueh of 
the technology involved is restricted. A subcommittee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Science Committee recently held a hearing on these challenges 
and heard testimony from principal players in the industry.4 Even London-based 
Virgin Galactic otTicers testified that "uncertainty about licensing requirements 
has prevented Virgin Galactic from viewing ... designs for the commercial spaee 
I Export Licensing. 70 Fcd. Reg. 15607 (Mar. 2X, 20(5). 
21d., at 15608. 
3 Update on Rccent Foreign Trade Controls Ikvclopll1cnts: Syria, Interdiction Sotlware, Deemed 
Exports, Mandatory AES and other Regulatory Changes, Covington & Burling Foreign Trade Controls Practice 
Group Newsletter. April 2005 (on tile with author). 
4 Douglas Jacobsen, CO/l//l/I'rcia! Si)(fcl'/lighl 11/I!IISIiT Facil1,!!. i:'xfJO/1 ("ol1lm! ISSIII'S, (April 25, 
2(05) al http://www.djacobsenlaw.coll1/tradelawnews.htl1ll. 
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vehicle that it intends to use .... [and has] prevented Virgin Galactic from placing 
a formal order ... for the vehicles.") 
Even for experienced exporters, the regulations on exports to eertain 
countrics can represent a shifting minefield. For example, in light of rccent 
developments, the sanctions against Iraq and Libya are now virtually gone, with 
limited restrictions remaining against trading with or investing in those countries. 
However, sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria prohibit practically all 
expOlis. In fact, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
recently published Syrian Sanctions Regulations.!' These regulations expand on 
and reinforce the prohibition on exports and reexports already in place, in part by 
making some prohibitions applicable regardless of whether the transaction 
involves a U.S. person. Limited sanctions are also in place against Angola, 
Burma (Myanmar), Colombia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia. 
In spite of the removal of some Indian and Pakistani names, the list of 
Specially Designated Nationals (SON) has grown to around 6,000. The SON list 
contains names of individuals and entities that are known to be engaged in or 
supportive of intemational terrorism, weapons trade, drug trade and other 
sanctioned activities. The penalties for doing business with any SDN are severe 
and often catch companies by surprise. For example, a French bank issuing a 
letter of credit on behalf of an overseas purchaser could be on the list if it had 
51d. 
(, 31 CY.R. pI. 54~. 
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deposits fi'om an SON in a third country. Any company engaged in foreign trade 
is advised to confirm that its transactions do not involve an SON. 
Not surprisingly, the Arab boycott of Israel is still alive and well. 
Companies involved in foreign trade with Arab League nations must establish a 
compliance program to ensure that no prohibited language occurs in any trading 
documents. Commonly, letters of credit from those nations contain statements 
that would restrict the parties from dealing with Israel. Accepting such language 
can result in criminal and tax penalties for U.S. companies and their subsidiaries. 
Finally, U.S. companies, executives and employees must continue to be 
vigilant in avoiding violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. A 
payment of "grease" or bribes overseas, even if made by an agent or distributor, 
can result in criminal fines and imprisonment for U.S. "persons." In the event an 
employee or officer is found personally guilty of a violation, the company cannot 
pay the criminal fines on his or her behalf. 
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